Confucius’ thought has been traditionally regarded as the most important guide for Confucianist political philosophy. First of all, the Confucian text contains many key topics of proper government and political ideals. Moreover, the eventual objective of Confucian doctrine lies in the pursuit of ideal politics. Because of the above-mentioned complexity of the hermeneutic reading of the original text, however, we cannot directly invoke Confucian political theory or even Confucian political philosophy. Instead, through reading Confucius’ political discourse, we shall attempt to attain the ethical domain to which the Analects refers.

1. The Political Ideal and Morality Signified by the Historically Remote Utopia

Living in the disorganized period of the feudal Chou dynasty, Confucius longed for the flourishing days of the Chou dynasty created by the two great Chou kings, Wen and Wu, and the Chou prince Tan. Confucius took these as a model of ideal politics in place of the contemporary conditions in the central and various local vassal states of the Chou, which he sharply criticized for opposing standard political morality. The contrast of an ideally good ancient politics and an actually evil contemporary politics is a basic pattern in Confucian moral-political criticism. In his view, good politics can only result from the rulers’ sincere love for his people and the latter’s sincere respect for and moral obedience to the ruler. Second, by choosing suitable politicians, the ruler should maintain the appropriate social and cultural institutions based on the traditional ritual system, which can realize the ultimate ideal of universal human love. Therefore, in politics, Confucius praised the distant past but rejected the present or near past. Of the two extremes, the distant past is only an ideal existence signifying political principles as such, while the latter is an empirical reality consisting of that which is directly observed. Accordingly, the former is a merely imaginary, while the latter is historically actual. Confucius was most of all a critic of social reality, political and non-political alike, in terms of his moral idealism. If he was not so exactly aware of what he really wanted, he must at least have been clear about what he did not want. His political philosophy was in fact negatively formed, systematically criticizing the current situation. Hence, we can say that he was primarily a critic of Chinese historical reality. The so-called political principles which he proposed are merely ethical in nature. From this point of view, Confucian political ethics functions negatively or is mainly negatively organized. More precisely, Confucius’ political idealism, which embodies itself in his historical nostalgia, plays an ethical rather than a political role.

Let us examine whether Confucius’ political utopia expresses a mature political philosophy. To this end, a comparison with ancient Greece is useful. In ancient Greek political philosophy, particularly the typical Aristotelian system, there are three main parts: political ethics, institutional arrangements and the education of the rulers and the people. (Cf. his Politics.) In Greek thought, the practical and the theoretical are treated in one coherent system. Consequently, political objectives and the practical means for attaining them are closely connected in a political and legal framework. In Confucius’ idea of politics, we can also find two similar parts: the level of the objective and that of the means towards it. He first designates a basic principle or general goal of political life through the special Chinese term “jen ” (which literally means “benevolence” or “love of people”), and he refers to a concrete way of attaining this ideal by means of the Chinese term “li” (which literally means “ritual ceremonies” and “manners”). Confucius’ political ideal is therefore called jen (benevolence)- or te (virtuous)-politics and his political practice could be called li (rites)-politics. Compared with Greek political thought, however, the Confucian doctrine is less clearly defined and less practicable: it focuses more on the basic moral ideal itself and historical imagination than on the feasibility of its political realization. His thought exhibits a basic epistemological and methodological split or inconsistency between the moral-political ideal and the historically practical political means. Thus, he attempts in vain to use the historically ready or feasible means for realizing ethically imaginable but politically abstract aims.

On the other hand, however, the significance of Confucian political philosophy goes beyond reflecting upon ethical orientations in human political life. Political philosophy as an intellectual domain is different from political science or political technique, which lays more emphasis on the conditions of realizing political objectives. In Greek philosophy as in Confucian thought, ethical and political problems are treated together, but in the latter there is a much weaker pragmatically rational tie between the two problems. In a word, the principle of Confucian jen-politics emphasizes the primacy of the ethical elements realized in a person’s heart and in social systems and practical policies. Because of this, ethical principles and basic political principles widely overlap.

Now we can answer why, despite its lack of political pragmatism, Confucius’ doctrine does not lose any historical relevance and theoretical depth in its political ethics. Regardless of all of its purely utopian dreams when judged against historical reality, Confucian doctrine does not become pointless as long as it focuses on the politico-ethical dimension. This means that a Confucian scholar can easily say how much the ruler and his regime are really addressing the welfare of the majority, although he need not know how to improve or reform the situation. The principal distinction between human political entities is based on an elementary ethical binary: the morally good and the morally bad. Consequently, when judging political phenomena, a Confucian scholar tends to accept binary ethical standard. This fashion of political judgement follows not only from his conception of political practice, but also from his view that the moral quality of politics results mainly from the moral motives of the rulers. In turn, moral motives can influence political morality: they mutually reflect each other.

2. The Weaker Political Dimension in Confucian Political Ethics

Although the character “cheng” (“politics” or “government”) occupies a central position in the Confucian text, the Confucian conception of politics remains theoretically non-political or purely moral. It is morally defined without reference to related political dimensions. Besides the remarkable split between the objective and the means which we explained in the last paragraph, a similar point to be noted is that, in distinction from his binary strategy in other areas, Confucius does not invoke a dichotomous set of political good and political evil despite his moral binarism. This means that his political ideal is more affirmatively or one-sidedly presented, although he clearly recognizes the existence of political evil. Nevertheless, he does not concentrate on the evil pole in his political descriptions. Symbolically, political evil is represented as a breach of the ritual system or order. Confucius defines politics in terms of abstract order or hierarchy rather than concrete political contrast, as his follower Mencius would do later in a more pertinent manner.

In general, Confucian political ethics misses its eventual object and objective of political morality. With an absolute emphasis on obedience to the li system, it requires the self-control of desire. The li doctrine stresses the virtue of private and public yielding to the other. Mutual yielding is based on mutual love, the immediate object of Confucian political ethics. Even in the psychological part of his political ethics, Confucius’ first principle is that of self-control for attaining the good of the self rather than struggle against the evil of another. Thus, he uses the li doctrine, which is eventually centered moral psychology, to replace political doctrine. Good political governing is mainly based on the good mind (13:13). Confucius’ political philosophy is a doctrine for promoting the good rather than one for resisting evil. Evil is only that which is a “non-jen “; it is not the main object of his political ethics. Hence, Confucius has not really considered the dynamic problems of political practice, for he lacks an overview over the entire realm of political elements. In other words, his political philosophy tends towards the positive aspect presented by the ideal. He teaches each political partner the same love and respect for the other as regulated in the li system. What he innovatively highlights is the sincerity of correct behavior according to the li system. What he has not thought through, however, is how to deal with the many practical factors of political life.

Concerning the political ideal, the Confucian jen doctrine most definitely concerns general love and the benefit of the majority. The ruler’s task lies in pursuing political goals rather than in enjoying political power for its own sack. For this reason, Confucius highly regards the ancient legend of the earliest kings’ abdication of power (1:8; 18:8), but he is less effective in understanding the entirety of conditions for attaining moral objectives through political means. His knowledge of both psychological and political conditions is extremely incomplete. He concerns himself mainly with the psychological conditions of moral sincerity and good manners based on self-control in dealing with others in the hierarchical relations of li, such as these between king or prince and minister, minister and people, among family members etc.

Among the various elements, sincerity based on self-control is always central. Confucius treats the ethical relation of two extremes in a one-sided manner. It is evident that the object of Confucian thought is not politics or government itself; and it is not even the li system itself. Instead, the object of his ethical consideration is simply the people’s attitude toward the established political and ritual system. In Confucian thought, political discourse is the means for expressing moral discourse; and the latter is in fact the means for expressing ethical subjectivity.

3. The Political System as a Social Nature

From the perspective of traditional Western political philosophy, Confucian political thought is evidently less effective in its applicability to historical reality. First, the chosen model represented by remote political legends is both unreliable and unable to be followed effectively in the actual historical process. If a political philosophy is a mere utopian daydream, it is not worthy of being seriously considered. In fact, however, Confucius’ doctrine is only a political philosophy in the special sense explained above. It is instead much closer to ethics than to politics. Or, its significance is manifested more in the ethical aspects of political philosophy than in politics itself. While the Western tradition of political philosophy has paid more attention to the connections between the ideal and the means for attaining the ideal, Confucius’ political philosophy seems to be careless about their relation. Similarly, the Western political ideal itself contains more practical elements, including the institutional. In ancient Greece, particularly in Aristotle’s political science, the problem of actual political systems occupies an important position. It is natural to design an institutional model immediately on the basis of an ethical ideal. Any ideal invented implies an intent to change or reform an incomplete political reality. By contrast, Confucius lacks a substantial impulse for the feasible reform of political reality.

1) li as Rite rather than Institution

What about the Confucian ideal itself ? Confucius has often been criticized for his intention to return to the older feudal model rather than propose a new one. Such criticism is based on a literal reading of Confucian discourse. What is the old ideal of political system which he preferred? Was there any essential difference between the old and contemporary systems? We find that there is simply no discussion at the political level in the Confucian text. Confucius and many other ancient scholars wished for better attitude, behavior and manners in order to support a traditionally established but subsequently deteriorated “ritual system” rather than erect a new one, let alone reform the basis of the political system itself. The so-called deterioration of the original Chou-li system means the general disobedience to the li rules of various kinds. The breach of rules means a lack of sincerity in the performance of the social and political obligations governing personal and public relationships in the Chou hierarchy. The idealized ancient utopia was used merely as a medium for expressing a politico-ethical concern, despite the fact that Confucius and others “really” took ancient history as their practical model. He calls for nothing other than the “recovery” or realization of sincerity towards the same system. His object is not the political or ritual system itself, but rather the attitude towards the latter. If so, the decay of “li” (the ritual system) is only linked with the quality of obedience to the system rather than with the system itself as a hierarchy of behavioral rules. Beyond ambiguous expressions about the entities to which reference is made, our hermeneutic reading should distinguish between actual thought and actual concern. We must point out that Confucius’ conception of li is one of ritual and ceremony rather than social and political systems which later Chinese scholars included in the term “li,” although Confucius himself lived and acted in a socio-political system functioning as the “natural” background of life and action. His ethical discourse is organized within li as the social system unconsciously taken as a natural or pre-established condition. In a word, social systems or institutions never became the direct object of his reflection.

At this point, we are confronted with a very important phenomenon in the history of Chinese political thought. Both Confucian and non-Confucian scholars paid more attention to problems of morality, style, manners and, at most, penal laws and political manoeuvres than to institutional problems at the “hard core” of politics. For Confucius, the transmitted political institutions were to be taken as “natural reality.” The given political systems were part of human circumstances just like the natural and cosmological conditions. Society has the same constant and natural structure as does the cosmos. The social and natural worlds had not get been divided clearly with respect to their existential nature and function; both of them were the background or stage for human activity. This view renders Confucius’ political thought quite different from its Greek counterpart. The political thought of both intellectual traditions has a different operational strategy. Confucius never thought about creating a new or an alternative system to replace the traditionally established one. He prided himself on being not an innovator, but instead a transmitter of the tradition. The choice of operational scope indicates the real referent of his ethico-political discourse: not the moral and political goals themselves, but the attitude towards the established goals. In this sense, we can even say that Confucius’ doctrine does not include a “true” political philosophy, let alone a primitive political science. He never allowed the political system or political technique itself to venture into his problematic. He addressed himself only towards the proper performance of the traditionally established system. On the other hand, however, there is indeed a causal link between moral motivation and related political effects. Confucius highlights this link regardless of the many intermediate layers between the two.

2) The Politico-ethical rather than the Ethico-political

In view of the meagerness of Confucius’ political doctrine we wish to stress once again the ethical aspect of political philosophy of any type, whether Oriental or Western. As we explained in detail above, Confucius’ idealism is limited to the level of the ethically ideal which is in no way less important than that of the practical level. The central problems of political philosophy, as a field separate from political science, are precisely those which involve ethical values. Politics is not only a technical mechanism; it contains technical and axiological dimensions at once, the latter frequently being much more relevant to the quality of political society than the former. Confucian political philosophy forms its own special epistemological framework for its own problematic, bracketing the historical problems of political systems in order to highlight the ethical relationship between political motivation and political effects. In general, there are two different inferential links in political logic: that between the motive and goal and that between the goal and the means. Confucian “political philosophy” concerns the first link alone.

Given this understanding of the limitations of Confucius’ political doctrine, we can better appreciate Confucius’ binarism. This primitive binarism has to do not with strategies of political sciences, but rather with a definite aspect of political ethics. The problem of political systems constitutes the boundary of Confucius’ political thought. His thought unfolds only within this limited space or inside this borderline, which bounds as well his binary strategy. The neglect of this necessary limitation by many modern students of Confucius’ doctrine has led to unjust criticism or pointless defence of Confucian political philosophy. This shows once again the extent to which we require a dialogue between ancient Chinese and modern ethics which takes account of their divergent terminologies and strategies.

Concerning the Chinese mode of political thought, we wish to observe that it is only after the Spring-Autumn period, that is, after Confucius’ era that the literati began inquiring into more practical problems. The subsequent Warring States period distinguishes itself in Chinese history through its active reflection upon practical political tactics. Since then both political thought and activity had been enriched. On the other hand, we can also say, Chinese institutional history was created and developed “autonomously,” even apart from its systematic intellectualization. Hence, we must pay heed to both dimensions of Chinese history: the institutional and the intellectual. Their interaction composes an especially intriguing field of inquiry.

3) The Ruler as the Part of the Institutional Nature

Confucius grew up and lived within a historical tradition whose political hierarchy maintained social order. As we said above, this transmitted social order was unreflectively felt and spontaneously accepted as “anthropological nature.” Confucius’ politico-ethical goal was then not a politically programmed ethical one. In general, ancient Chinese literati did not deal with the relationship between the external goal and the external means at a theoretical level, a concern which we find in Greek philosophy. Accordingly, Chinese intellectual power never attained the stage of reflection on the typological problems of political systems. The current political system is a condition of activity, never the object of thought. Thus, Confucius can only employ the established system to pursue his ethical ideal. Therefore, throughout Confucius’ life, we find an interesting self-contradictory attitude towards political rulers. A single ruler plays two roles simultaneously: he is the representative of a position in the system and the practitioner of a chosen policy. Respect for order led to respect for position within the order. Accordingly, and therewith respect for the holder of the position. Therefore, Confucius’ respect for rulers of the states is in essence respect for the authoritative order equivalent to natural existence. His criticism, however, is oriented towards the other aspect of the rulers’ identity as policy maker in accordance with the li system, as the practitioner of li. The wisdom of Confucius’ political philosophy cannot deal with the two roles of the ruler separately, so that his final decision is one of disappointment. His retirement from power solves his own psychological contradiction between respect for the holder of power as carrying out a sacred function and disappointment in the prince as being only human.